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"... the legal right of a parent to the custody of a child ends
at the 18th birthday: and even up till then, it is a dwindling
right which the courts will hesitate to enforce against the
wishes of the child, and the more so the older he is. It
starts with a right of control and ends with little more than
advice."l
INTRODUCTION
Ask any family law teacher or student of family law which decision of the
English courts has made the greatest contribution to the acceptance of the
idea of children's rights and the answer would almost certainly be the
Gillick case? True enough, the majority of the House of Lords
established in that case that the legal capacity of a child to be involved in
important decisions affecting him or her did not depend at common law
exclusively on arbitrary age-limits but rather on the level of maturity and
understanding of the individual child. Thus, the notion of the gathering
independence of adolescents took root and is now expressed in many
places in the Children Act 19893 and, internationally, in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.4 But it is possible,
perhaps, to overlook that there was a second, equally important, aspect to
the Gillick litigation. The decision also reasserted that there were limits to
the legal authority of parents, despite the fact that parental 'rights' or
'custody,' now reconceptualised as 'parental responsibility,' continue to
exist right up to the child's attainment of majority. It can plausibly be
* Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge.
L Lord Denning M.R. in Hewer v. Bryant [1970] 1 Q,B.357 at 369.
2 Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 1 F.L.R. 224.
3 See particularly s.1(3)(a), s.22(4), s.38(6) and s.43(8).
4 Article 12 requires States Parties to "assure to the child who is capable of fOlming his own
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child."
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argued that Lord Denning's famous dictum in Hewer v. Bryant, set out
above, was the real foundation for this part of the majority decision in
Gillick and, in that sense, has contributed as much, if not more, to the
development of English law's approach to the legal relationship of parent
and child.
In this short tribute to Lord Denning I would go further. It will be my
contention that if greater attention had been paid in the post-Gillick period
to the spirit of what Lord Denning had to say in 1969 the law would not
now be in the unsatisfactory and somewhat confused state in which it
undoubtedly is. This is a charge which I would lay primarily, but not
exclusively, at the doorstep of the Court of Appeal. Neither the former
Conservative government nor the present Labour administration seem to
have done at all well in comprehending what Lord Denning took to be
self-evident thirty years ago - that as the independence of children
gradually takes hold, so parental control 'dwindles.'
HEWER v. BRYANT: THE DECISION
Hewer v. Bryant was not a case falling within the traditional parameters of
family law. Indeed, if those same family law teachers and students were
asked to recall what the principal issue was in the case most would be
very hard pressed to do so. It is indeed a tribute in itself to Lord Denning
that a case which really had nothing to do with family law has continued
to exert such an influence on thinking in the subject.
The facts, characteristically with Lord Denning, are easier to glean from
his judgment than they are from any other part of the report including the
headnote:
"Fergus Hewer was born on December 28, 1946. So he is
now 22. On August 15, 1962, when he was 15 years and
eight months, he was seriously injured in a motor accident.
He could not himself bring an action for damages at that
time because he was under 21 [the then age ofmajority].5
His father might have brought an action on his behalf, as
his next friend, but he did not do so. So Fergus, as soon as
he was 21, issued a writ himself. It was issued on January
16, 1968, a week or two after his 21st. birthday. The
defendant says the action is barred by the Statutes of
Limitation. He says that Fergus was at the time of the
5 The age of majority was reduced from 21 to 18 very shortly after the decision in Hewer v.
Bryant by the Family Law Reform Act 1969.
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accident 'in the custody of a parent,' and that an action is
barred after three years from the date of the accident.,,6
It is important to understand the argument of counsel for the defendant
since it is essentially the argument which was to resurface again fifteen
years later in the Gillick saga - and not just resurface but be unanimously
upheld by the Court of Appeal. The gist of the argument was that
"custody" when used in a statute was a technical legal term which should
be given a technical legal interpretation.? It was possible to determine
definitively who in law was vested with "custody" in relation to a child
and, once determined, that was the end of the matter. The child was either
in the "custody" of a person in this technical sense or not and the factual
situation of the child's position vis-a-vis that person was irrelevant.
Therefore the fact that Fergus Hewer was living independently from his
parents and was employed as an agricultural worker when the accident
occurred was, according to this argument, of no significance to the
question whether he was in the "custody" of his parents. If he was, any
civil action would need to be brought on his behalf by his parents even
though they were under no legal duty to bring it.
Lord Denning would have none of this and enquired of counsel whether
"the pop-singer who, though under twenty-one, earns thousands a year"
was also "in the custody of a parent" so that if he should be injured the
parent would be required to sue on his behalf within the three-year
limitation period. For Lord Denning the concept of "custody" as used in
the context of the Limitation Acts, denoted "a state of fact and not a state
of law." An infant was only to be regarded as "in the custody of a parent"
for these purposes where he was "in the effective care and control of a
parent at the time of the accident."g On this test Fergus Hewer was clearly
not in his father's custody having, at the relevant time, left home and
taken up employment miles away as a farm-worker at the agricultural
wage. Accordingly his claim was not statute-barred.
Lord Denning rejected the notion of absolute authority over children,
exemplified by the Victorian parent, taking the view that the common law
6 By virtue of an amendment introduced in 1954 an infant who had suffered personal injuries
was to be barred from bringing an action after three years from the date of the accident unless
he could prove that he "was not, at the time when the right of action accrued to him, in the
custody of a parent." (S.2(2) of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, etc) Act 1954
amending s.22 of the Limitation Act 1939).
? As Raymond Kidwell Q.c. and Hilary Barker for the defendant put it:
"When Parliament in 1939, after centuries of history, used the words 'in the custody of a
parent' they should be taken to have intended that bundle of rights and duties comprised
in the common law concept of 'custody' familiar in every branch of family
jurisdiction." [at p.363].
B Supra n.l at p.370.
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"can, and should, keep pace with the times.,,9 But the spectre ofthe
Victorian parent was to re-emerge in the Thatcherite 80s in the shape and
form of Victoria Gillick. 10
GILLICK AND THE INFLUENCE OF HEWER v. BRYANT
Mrs. Gillick, as is well-known, asserted, inter alia, that in the matter of
contraceptive advice or treatment given to girls under the age of sixteen
the parent had an unqualified right to be consulted and a veto on such
dealings between children and the medical profession. She lost at first
instance before Woolf 1. (as he then was) who, in the course of his
judgment, relied on "the vivid language of Lord Denning" and took the
view that he was not required "to ignore the change in attitudes since the
Victorian era.,,11
The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, had no difficulty relying on the
late Victorian decision in Re Agar-Ellis in which the court had upheld the
absolute authority of a father over his seventeen-year-old daughter which
was said to continue unabated until the acquisition of majority at twenty-
one.12 Parker L.J. noted Lord Denning's "trenchant criticism" of this
decision but also observed that:
"Lord Denning was clearly of the view that the legal right
to custody continues, and should continue, up to but not
beyond, the child's 18th. birthday (which it does) albeit
that the right was a dwindling one."
For Parker L.J. this legal right of control of the parent was unassailable,
subject only to the court's power to intervene where the parent was not
thought to be acting in the child's best interests. Fox L.J. took the same
position but expressed it somewhat differently. According to him,
"Lord Denning ... despite his criticism of Re Agar-Ellis did
not doubt that legal custody should continue to 18 though
as the child gets older it may, in practice, be a waning right
unless the court is prepared to support it for the child's
welfare."l3
9 Ibid at p.369.
10 Mrs Margaret Thatcher (now Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven), the then Prime Minister,
famously favoured a return to "Victorian values" not least in relation to the family.
11 [1984] F.L.R. 249 at 261.
12 (1883) 24 Ch.D. 317.
13 [1985] F.L.R. 736 at 750-751.
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The essence, therefore, of the Court of Appeal's decision was that unless
and until someone challenged the exercise of parental authority before the
courts, that authority or control remained absolute. "Custody," by this
time more accurately known as "parental rights and duties,,14 was either
vested in someone or not, in a technical legal sense and, subject to
possible intervention by the court, that was the end of the matter. In other
words, the very argument of counsel for the defendant in Hewer v. Bryant,
so comprehensively dispatched by Lord Denning, was uncritically
accepted by the Court of Appeal in Gillick.
The House of Lords allowed the appeal ofthe D.H.S.S. by a thin
majority of three-two. IS It is perhaps revealing that the two dissenting
members, Lords Brandon and Templeman, made no reference whatever in
their respective speeches to Hewer v. Bryant and, as we shall see, apart
from one passing reference this is very largely true of the judgments in
two subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeal which have come to
represent "the retreat from Gillick.,,16 The principal majority speeches of
Lords Fraser and Scarman, on the contrary, rely heavily on what Lord
Denning had to say - in particular his scathing criticism of the Re Agar-
Ellis case which Lord Scarman described as "horrendous" and "rightly
remaindered to the history books by the Court of Appeal in Hewer v.
Bryant."17 Lord Fraser agreed with "every word" of Lord Denning's
dictum and "especially with the description of the father's authority as a
dwindling right." 18 So it was that the House of Lords, albeit by majority,
was able to hold robustly that there were indeed legal limits on parental
control which was not absolute despite its continuation right up to the
child's majority. As Lord Scarman put it "parental rights are derived from
parental duty and exist only so long as they are needed for the protection
of the person or property of the child,,19and Lord Fraser was at pains to
underline that such rights existed for the benefit of the child and not for
the benefit of the parent.20 But the majority decision went further than
this. It also appeared to establish definitively that in the event of a clash
between the views of a child factually competent to take his own decision
14 The concept was contained in s.85 Children Act 1975 and was defined to mean "all the
rights and duties which by law the mother and father have in relation to a legitimate child and
his property."
IS Supra n.2.
16 Re R (AMinor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 F.L.R.190 and Re W (A Minor)
(Consent to Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 F.L.R. 1. The phrase was first used by Gillian
Douglas in "The Retreat from Gillick" (1992) 55 M.L.R. 569.
17 Supra n. 2 at p.248.
18 Ibid at p.238.
19 Ibid at p.249.
20 Ibid at p.235.
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and that of his parent the child's views should be given priority. Lord
Scarman seemed particularly clear about this when he said:
"the parental right yields to the child's right to make his
own decisions when he reaches a sufficient understanding
and intelligence to be capable of making up his own mind
on the matter requiring decision.,,21
THE POST-GILLICK ERA: THE NEGLECT OF HEWER v.
BRYANT
As we approach the twenty-first century we cannot say with confidence
that we have put behind us the influence of the nineteenth. Quite a
number of legal developments over the decade or so since Gillick suggest
that there will continue to be an uneasy co-existence of the gathering
independence of young people and the responsibility of their parents. The
terminology has changed. We now confront much more openly the idea
that children are persons capable of possessing "rights" and, far from
asserting the "custody" or "rights" of parents, we now talk of "parental
responsibility.'.22 Yet the central issue with which Lord Denning got to
grips thirty years ago is much the same today. How precisely can we
acknowledge and respect the growing independence of children without
denying what is indisputable - that parental responsibility remains intact
until those children reach majority? Lord Denning's opinion was that the
level of parental control decreased inversely to the extent of the individual
child's factual capacity. It dwindled. But an examination of leading
decisions of the Court of Appeal and legislation introduced by
governments of both complexion shows that there is considerable
reluctance to accept what many thought to be a fundamental principle
entrenched by Gillick.
Let us begin with the Court of Appeal. In two major decisions, Re R23
and Re W24 the Court has contrived to hold that while a "Gillick-
competent" child can provide a valid consent to certain medical
procedures, that same child has no equivalent right or capacity to refuse
them. The intricacies of the arguments in these cases are beyond the
21 Ibid at p.2S1.
22 The definition of "parental responsibility" is now contained in s.3(1) Children Act 1989 and
is remarkably similar to the former definition of "parental rights and duties" (see supra n.14).
It is defined to include "all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by
law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property."
23 See supra n.16.
24 Ibid
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scope of the present discussion25 but, in the final analysis, the central
argument which prevailed is not very far removed from the one which has
already reared its ugly head several times in the course of this article.
This is that while children may go on merrily accumulating independent
capacities this does not terminate or detract from the ongoing
responsibilities of parents - specifically in this context to provide a
consent which would protect the medical profession against a possible
tortious action arising from unauthorised contact with a child. Lord
Donaldson neatly skipped around what Lord Scarman had to say in Gillick
by holding that he had only really meant to say that parental powers were
not determinative in the sense that the parent could not be said to have a
veto over medical procedures. But this did not mean that the parent's
concurrent right to provide a consent was obliterated by the acquisition of
the child's capacity. Either the competent child, or the parent, held a key
which could unlock the door to the procedure concemed26 and either could
provide the medical profession with a "flakjacket" against a possible
tortious action.27
Lord Donaldson did not refer in either decision to the opinion of Lord
Denning in Hewer v. Bryant.28 It is a pity that he did not do so since, as
demonstrated above, it was the foundation of the majority view in Gillick
about the nature of parents' authority or responsibility. Would Lord
Denning really have allowed into English law the illogicality of conferring
on children the right to consent but not the right to refuse? Would he have
been inspired by the prospect of a teenager being told: "It doesn't matter
what you want. Your parents want it and, in the end, that's all that
counts"? I rather doubt it.
Some of the policies of the former Conservative government and the
present Labour government are also difficult to reconcile with Lord
Denning's notion of "dwindling" parental authority. Take, for example,
the education policy of the Conservatives throughout their long period of
office which was dominated by the notion of "parental choice." There
was earlllegislation to entrench parental preferences regarding choice of
schoo1.2 Subsequent legislation increased parents' representation on
governing bodies while abolishing the office of pupil governor.30 Then
25 For a fuller discussion see Andrew Bainham, Children: The Modem Law (2nd.ed., Jordans,
1998) at pp.273-281.
26 The metaphor used in Re R. supra n.16.
27 The metaphor used in Re W, supra n.16, the keyllock metaphor being discarded by this
time.
28 The only reference to Hewer v. Bryant in any of the judgments in either Re R or Re Wwas a
~assing reference to it by Farquharson L.J. at [1992] 1 F.L.R. 190 at 206.
9 The Education Act 1980.
30 The Education (No.2) Act 1986.
87
DENNING LAW JOURNAL
we had the "parents' charter" and publication of school "performance
tables.,,3l Perhaps most strikingly of all, at least in the context of this
article, was the creation in 1993 of an absolute right for parents to
withdraw their children from sex education classes except in so far as
what is taught falls within the requirements of the National Curriculum.32
This right of withdrawal is unqualified and exists alongside a similarly
unrestricted right of withdrawal from religious education and acts of
collective worship which originates from the nineteenth century.33
The arguments about the provision of sex education or religious
education and worship in schools are complex and controversial and this
is not the place to rehearse them.34 But what must be clear to everyone is
that the former Conservative government's view of the role of parents in
education was very far removed from the idea of diminishing control.
There is little in any of the Education Acts to support the notion that
children have any independent rights despite the fact that they spend
almost as much of their lives in school as they do in the family home. On
the contrary, what we do find support for is the concept of absolute
parental discretion, rejected in Hewer v. Bryant, which continues up to the
age of majority - at least as far as sex and religion are concerned.35 There
is not so much as a hint that parental control "dwindles" or that children
have independent views or interests.
The policy of the Labour government towards juvenile crime illustrates
another approach to the interrelationship of children's capabilities and
parents'responsibilities.36 In its own way it is equally at odds with the
philosophy of Hewer v. Bryant. On the one hand, it does appear to be
grounded in the notion of personal responsibility for crime on the part of
juveniles themselves and this might be thought consistent with the idea of
growing independence and autonomy. As the child gets older and
achieves more capacity for decision-making so that child or young person
should accept the greater measure of responsibility which goes with it. 37
3\ First issued by the then Department of Education and Science in 1991.
32 The National Curriculum in relation to sex education expressly does not include education
about AIDS, illY and sexually transmitted diseases. (See now s.405 of the Education Act
1996, originally s.241 Education Act 1993).
33 The Elementary Education Act 1870.
34 For more detailed treatment see N. Harris, Law and Education: Regulation. Consumerism
and the Education System (Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), chapter 7 and Bainham, supra n.25
chapter 16.
35 It is interesting to note, for example, that although the age of consent for sexual intercourse
is sixteen, young people above that age may be denied sex education by parental withdrawal.
36 Set out in its White Paper, No More Excuses: A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime in
England and Wales (Cm.3809) (The Stationery Office, 1997).
37 Indeed the attitude of the last two governments towards juvenile crime has taken on an
increasingly punitive, authoritarian aspect perhaps epitomised most by the introduction of
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Having said that, the abolition of the doli incapax presumption in relation
to children aged at least ten but under fourteen by the Crime and Disorder
Act 199838is hardly consistent with the gradual acquisition of legal
capacity supported by both Hewer v. Bryant and Gillick. Children will
now, in principle, be wholly criminally responsible on the sudden
attainment ofthe age often. As Tony Smith has put it (commenting on
the decision ofthe Divisional Court in C v. D.P.P.)
"we now have a law which holds that a person is
completely irresponsible on the day before his tenth
birthday, and fully responsible as soon as the jelly and ice-
cream have been cleared away the following day.,,39
The government in its White Paper which preceded the 1998 legislation
appeared to accept, in relation to juvenile crime, something very like what
Lord Denning was talking about in 1969:40
"As they develop, children must bear an increasing
responsibility for their actions, just as the responsibility of
parents gradually declines - but does not disappear - as
their children approach adulthood.,,41
It is when we tum to what has actually been done in the Crime and
Disorder Act that we can see the real thinking is one of dual responsibility
for crime. Children and parents are in essence conceptualised as jointly
and severally responsible for the increase in juvenile crime which is seen
as a matter of personal and family responsibility. Thus, far from repealing
Conservative legislation which had made parents directly accountable for
the crimes of their children through fines, the payment of compensation,
costs and controversial bind-over powers42 the Labour government has
carried this policy further by the introduction of the new "parenting
order.,,43The order will be available in relation to parents of convicted
young offenders or of children who are the subject of the new "anti-social
custodial sentences for persistent young offenders with the creation of "secure training
centres" by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.
38 S.34.
39 [1994] 3 W.L.R. 888 and A.T.H. Smith "Doli Incapax Under Threat" (1994) CL.l. 426 at
427. The decision of the Divisional Court was subsequently reversed by the House of Lords
([1995] 2 W.L.R. 383) which held that any change in the law was for Parliament and not for
the courts.
40 Supra n.38.
41 Ibid at para 4.1.
42 S.58 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991.
43 Ss.8-10 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
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behaviour order, sex offender order or child safety order" as well as those
parents convicted of offences relating to school attendance.44 It will
require them to attend counselling or guidance sessions and the order may
include other requirements relating to such matters as ensuring the child's
attendance at school or that he is home by a certain time each night.
There are strong civil libertarian objections to these powers involving as
they do substantial state intrusion into the way in which families conduct
themselves. There is doubt also about whether they are in compliance
with the United Kingdom's international obligations. But in the context
of the present discussion the key point is that they rest on the dubious
assumption that parents remain fully in control of their minor children and
can be brought to book for their transgressions - not much evidence here
of "dwindling" parental control. The new law makes little or no allowance
for the potential conflict of interest between parents and children and does
not acknowledge the reality that many teenagers are infact beyond the
control of their parents. It should moreover be pointed out that the extent
to which a parent might lawfully resort to measures of physical restraint to
control a wayward child is now open to considerable doubt - and the older
the child, the more legally suspect such disciplinary measures are likely to
be.45
CONCLUSION
There remain very many uncertainties and difficulties for the law in
striking an appropriate balance between children's gradual progression
towards adulthood and the contemporaneous, ongoing responsibility
which attaches to parents. Hewer v. Bryant was without question an
important landmark in the attempt to achieve this accommodation. Lord
Denning's simple, yet memorable, solution to this problem - that as the
44 It should be noted that it is the parent and not the child who is legally liable in relation to
the child's non-attendance at school - see s.7 Education Act 1996.
45 A parent may in principle be liable for the false imprisonment of the child where the
restraint of the child is "for such a period or in such circumstances as to take it out of the
realm of reasonable parental discipline" (see R v. Rahman (1985) 81 Cr.App.R. 349). And,
increasingly, the parental right to administer corporal punishment is being called into question
and challenged under the European Convention on Human Rights - see A. v. United Kingdom
(Human Rights: Punishment of child) [1998] 2 F.L.R. 959. In this case the stepfather of A had
beaten him severely on several occasions with a garden cane. He was acquitted of assault
having successfully raised the defence of "reasonable chastisement." The European Court of
Human Rights subsequently found the United Kingdom to be in breach of Article 3 of the
Convention in allowing the defence to be raised in circumstances such as this, which
amounted to "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." At the time of writing the
government is engaged in a consultation exercise about the appropriate limits of parental
discipline.
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one grows the other dwindles - revealed, characteristically for him, an
insight which was perhaps ahead of the times. It was certainly a good deal
more enlightened than much of the clumsiness which has followed in the
intervening thirty years. The Court of Appeal has found itself
acknowledging rights for adolescents in some areas but refusing them in
others for arguably no better reason than a preoccupation with protecting
the medical profession against law suits. The Conservative
administrations of Margaret Thatcher and John Major wholly failed to
give effect, in their education policy, to the growing acceptance in society
of the notion of children's rights and instead supported an absolutist view
of parental control. And Labour too, to the surprise of many, appears to
favour an approach to tackling youth crime which fails, at one and the
same time, to accept that the personal responsibility of juveniles for crime
should be a gradual process dependent on age and maturity and that
parental responsibility should correspondingly decline.
Perhaps what all this suggests is that whatever else we allow to
"dwindle" in the coming years it ought not to be the influence of Lord
Denning's common sense in Hewer v. Bryant.
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